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First Amendment Topics



ABORTION PROTEST RESTRICTIONS



FUNERAL PROTESTS



CAMPAIGN FINANCE LIMITS



UNION FAIR SHARE DUES

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech . . . .”


Incorporated to apply to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.







Justice Black: no law means no law!
Should the First Amendment be treated as an
absolute protection of freedom of speech?
What’s good about the absolutist approach?





The absolute position ensures maximum
protection.
Avoids clunky line-drawing!



What’s wrong with it?



Shouting “Fire!” in a crowded movie house.



Perjury.





Sexual harassment. “Sleep with me or you’re
fired.”
Defamation.







Surely screaming in the Supreme Court all the
time is not permissible.
Or having a sound truck blast full volume in
the middle of the night in a residential
neighborhood.
Since absolutism probably does not work,
lines must be drawn.





Humans do lots of activities. Why protect
speech as fundamental?
Why is speech protected by strict scrutiny in
many circumstances?



Speech is often quite harmful.



What are the justifications?





Holmes’s “marketplace of ideas”
Everybody gets to talk – toward the end of
discerning the truth!



Falsehoods will be countered with truth!



Problems with that?



Might there not be a “market failure” that demands
government intervention?



Are we sure that truth will prevail over falsehoods?



That all views will be heard?





Aren’t there some truths that should not be uttered?
National security info; private facts; (better to
suppress?)
What about speech just for fun? Not for truth? Is it
also protected? Bork?



Freedom of speech is a terrible way to
advance knowledge, but it’s better than the
alternatives.



“the central meaning of the First Amendment”



Justice Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney v.



N.Y. Times v. Sullivan
California

How does speech accomplish this?





Democracy is based on holding government
accountable.
And speaking up about what the government
is doing is the only way of holding it
accountable.



It’s a check on the government.



It’s also a safety-valve for dissent.







Was the First Amendment really about protecting
speech to further critical self-government?
1798 – just seven years after the ratification of
the First Amendment, Congress (many Framers
included) passed the Sedition Act.
Can’t government intervene in the marketplace to
further good government? Shouldn’t it? (By
limiting campaign expenditures?)



Assuming that’s the kind of speech that the
Framers were most worried about.



Under Judge Robert Bork’s theory, most (not
all) questions are easy.
Sexual harassment is not protected.
Rape victim’s identity is not protected.



They are not political issues.






Why should only political speech be valued?



Art?



Labor protests?







Speech is INTRINSICALLY BENEFICIAL.
Justice Thurgood Marshall: “[T]he human spirit . .
. demands self-expression.”
Freedom of thought is a key value and speech is
essential to it.



Self-determination!



PROBLEMS?








Bork: Aren’t other non-speech-related
activities such as sexuality, family, or even
employment far more important to
autonomy?
What about speech that affects others?
Pornography that exploits women?
Hate speech?







Institutional incompetence.
It is unlikely that the government “will get it
right” when it comes to censorship.
Majority abuse.





IF THE GOVERNMENT RESTRAINS SPEECH
BASED ON ITS CONTENT, IT GENERALLY MUST
SATISFY STRICT SCRUTINY.
IF IT THE RESTRAINT IS CONTENT-NEUTRAL,
IT NEED ONLY SATISFY INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY.





THE RESTRAINT MUST BE NARROWLY
TAILORED TO A COMPELLING
GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSE.
Here, “narrowly tailored” usually means the
“least restrictive means.”



Regulations in traditional public forums will
be upheld if they are time, place, or manner
restrictions that substantially advance an
important government interest and leave
open alternative means of communication.
Must be narrowly tailored, but does not need
to be the least restrictive means.





Review of a Florida state court injunction
issued against repeat offenders who blocked
access.
Imposed a 36-foot buffer zone around the
clinic at issue.







“We . . . look to the government’s purpose as
the threshold consideration.”
“There is no suggestion in this record that
Florida law would not equally restrain similar
conduct directed at a target having nothing
to do with abortion; none of the restrictions
imposed by the court were directed at the
contents of petitioner’s message.”
Intermediate, not strict, scrutiny.





36-foot buffer zone around the clinic
entrances and driveway burdens no more
speech than necessary to accomplish the
governmental interest at stake:
protect the health and well-being of clinic
patients.








State law prevented knowingly approaching
within 8 feet of a person within 100 feet of a
health care facility for “protest, education, or
counseling.”
Content-based (strict scrutiny)?
Content-neutral (reasonable time, place,
manner restriction)?
What do you think?







Majority: Content-neutral.
Regardless of the counseling is pro- or antichoice.
HUH?







The purpose and effect are stopping antiabortion protests: content-based!
Shouldn’t you be able to look at the actual
purpose of the law?
(In which case, might it pass strict scrutiny?)





Why not concede that it is content-based?
Isn’t there a compelling governmental
purpose anyway?



Applied intermediate scrutiny.



Significant government interests?







Significant purpose: shielding unwilling
hearers from messages they consider
offensive. HUH?
The “right to be let alone” articulated by
Justice Brandeis. HUH!?
How can that be a legitimate government
interest in the free speech realm??





A distinction?
A person who wore a jacket that said, “[F] the
draft” could not be convicted of disturbing
the peace of people who saw it.







NARROW “CAPTIVE” AUDIENCE:
You can’t curb speech just because it offends,
unless there is a “substantial privacy interest”
that is being invaded in an “essentially
intolerable manner.”
How would you respond?
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“The First Amendment does not demand that
patients at a medical facility undertake
Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of
political protests.” Madsen, 512 U.S. at 77273.
Patients going to a medical facility deserve
more privacy.





Facial challenge to a 35-foot fixed buffer
zone around free-standing abortion clinics.

Not eight feet from a person, but a fixed

zone from the clinic.

(1) persons entering or leaving such facility;
(2) employees or agents of such facility acting
within the scope of their employment;
(3) law enforcement, ambulance, firefighting,
construction, utilities, public works and other
municipal agents acting within the scope of
their employment; and
(4) persons using the public sidewalk or street
right-of-way adjacent to such facility solely
for the purpose of reaching a destination
other than such facility.



First Circuit rejected arguments by the
plaintiffs that the size of the zone and the
exceptions made it a content-based
restriction.



Substantial governmental interest?



Narrowly tailored?



Ample alternative channels?



Plaintiffs: this rejects the constitutional
conversational distance protected by Hill.



Essentially bans handbilling.



Not aimed at repeated offenders as in



Madsen.

First Circuit: They can do whatever they want
outside the buffer zone. The zone is not
unreasonable in size.



Words directed to another person likely to
provoke a violent response.



“You are a [] racketeer and a [] Fascist and the
whole Government of Rochester are Fascists
or agents of Facists!”



Convicted under state law.



SCOTUS?
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SCOTUS: Fighting words are unprotected.
Chaplinsky resorted to epithets and personal
abuse.
Why are fighting words unprotected?

46







“By their very utterance [they] inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.”
“The test is what men of common intelligence
would understand would be words likely to
cause an average addressee to fight.”
EXAMPLE: epithets and abuse.

47







1) Because it does create a RISK of violence
and inflicts injury.
2) The speech is of such low value since such
words “are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas.”
“Categorical balancing”: the speech is not
worth much protection.

48



Is the Court right that hurled epithets do NOT
contribute to the search for the truth?



To democratic deliberation?



To self-governance?

49







NOT PROTECTED AS A CLASS.
BUT THE STATUTES MUST BE NARROWLY
DRAWN SO AS NOT TO SWEEP IN PROTECTED
SPEECH.
WHEN NARROWLY DRAWN, THEY CAN’T
DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF VIEWPOINT.
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FIRST QUESTION:
If there is a private suit for speech between
two parties, why is there state action?
Why is the First Amendment implicated?





State law allows for recovery.
The court, the arm of the state, is ordering
recovery.







Jerry Falwell: public figure
Unanimous court rejects IIED unless a public
figure shows falsity and actual malice.
Why?





1) Protection of defamation jurisprudence.
(Avoiding an end-run around the standard
articulated in NYT v. Sullivan.)
2) The need to protect satire and parody.
BREATHING SPACE for protected speech.







Why is there constitutional value to this
speech?
Was this the kind of public debate the
Framers wanted to protect?
Does it contribute to self-governance?



Should that be treated differently?









“God Almighty killed Lance Cpl. Snyder. He
died in shame, not honor—for a fag nation
cursed by God .... Now in Hell.”
“God Hates You” and “Thank God for Dead
Soldiers”
God had caused Matthew's death in
retribution for his sins.
“You're Going to Hell” and “Not Blessed Just
Cursed.”



Is it a matter of public or private concern?





“[T]he overall thrust and dominant theme of
[their] demonstration spoke to” broad public
issues.
Determined by looking at the content, form,
and context.








Westboro's means of communicating its views
consisted of picketing in a place where picketing
was lawful and in compliance with all police
directions.
In a public place on a matter of public concern.
Snyder could see no more than the tops of the
signs.
Thus, it is entitled to “special protection,” and the
“outrageousness” requirement of IIED is not
adequate.








On appeal, Westboro chose not to contest the
sufficiency of the evidence.
They did not dispute that Mr. Snyder suffered
“‘wounds that are truly severe and incapable of
healing themselves.’ ”
Nor did they dispute that their speech was “‘so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ”
Instead, they maintained that the First
Amendment gave them a license to engage in
such speech.





NOT FIGHTING WORDS?
“The Court suggests that respondents'
personal attack on Matthew Snyder is entitled
to First Amendment protection because it was
not motivated by a private grudge, but I see
no basis for the strange distinction that the
Court appears to draw.”



“And as far as culpability is concerned, one
might well think that wounding statements
uttered in the heat of a private feud are less,
not more, blameworthy than similar
statements made as part of a cold and
calculated strategy to slash a stranger as a
means of attracting public attention.”



What about a 300-foot buffer?





300-foot buffer between all funerals and
funeral processions and any demonstrations.
McCreary wished to picket in a nondisruptive manner within 300 feet on a public
right-of-way.



Content-based: strict scrutiny



Content-neutral: intermediate scrutiny







No question the law was aimed at the Westboro
Baptist protestors.
That said: the provisions at issue apply
evenhandedly to all speakers and to all
communications whether likely to incite violence
or not.
Thus, citizens are prohibited from
“demonstrating” within 300 feet of a funeral with
a sign stating “Thank You for Your Service”.



The Court will assume that the state has an
interest in protecting funeral attendees from
unwanted communications that are so
obtrusive that they are impractical to avoid.
Narrowly tailored?





The law burdens “substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the government's
legitimate interests.”
Why?








300 feet is broad
All activity is banned within that area,
regardless of whether the funeral participants
can hear or not.
All images are banned, as is distribution of
literature.
It would restrict communications to the
public unrelated to the funeral.



Manchester's ordinance limits picketing and
“other protest activities” which are defined as
“any action that is disruptive or undertaken to
disrupt or disturb a funeral or burial service.”
Restricts “picketing or other protest activities
that are directed at a funeral or burial service.”



The ordinance does not restrict picketing or
protesting funeral processions.





Background: Nixon Administration officials
solicited contributions from corporations and
used illegal slush funds.
Nixon caught on tape approving the buying
of the silence of Watergate burglars.







1) Limited contributions a person could make
to a candidate’s campaign to $1000.
PAC - $5000 limit
2) Limited expenditures to promote a
candidate to $1000 per person







Spending is like pure speech and not
conduct, so O’Brien does not apply.
Why is spending pure speech?
Why isn’t it conduct and O’Brien should
apply?





In the political context, money means “I
support you.” MONEY TALKS!
Do you agree?







The government can regulate conduct which
communicates if:
1) it is within the constitutional power of the
government;
2) it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
3) the government’s interest is unrelated to
suppression of free expression; and
4) the incidental restriction on First
Amendment freedoms is not greater than
necessary to further that interest.





Even if it were conduct and not pure speech,
it would fail the O’Brien test because the
purpose of the law is to limit expression.
It necessarily reduces the number of issues
discussed, the depth or their exploration, and
the size of the audience that can be reached.





Limits on contributions to a campaign are
constitutional.
Why?









Contribution limits will not have any dramatic
effect on the funding of campaigns and
political associations.
“Marginal restriction” on the ability to speak.
Minimal speech interest in the size of
contribution. (HUH?)
The speech interest is just the mere act of
giving, not the size. (Huh?!)









Interest in eliminating corruption is strong:
protecting the integrity of our officeholders.
Avoiding “quid pro quo” corruption.
Avoids corruption and the appearance of
corruption. HUH?!
Problems?







Is maintaining the APPEARANCE of integrity
really a compelling governmental interest?
Is the contribution limit really narrowly
tailored to advance the government’s
interests?
If the interest is the APPEARANCE of
corruption?



Government justifications?



Anti-corruption!



Avoiding the appearance of corruption!



SCOTUS?









The governmental interest is not compelling: the
link between expenditures and corruption is far
less direct. HUH?!
Does not pose dangers of quid pro quo
corruption. WHAT?!
Greater burden on the First Amendment: “direct
and substantial restraints [on] the quantity of
campaign speech.”
It directly restricts public discourse.







REJECTED JUSTIFICATIONS:
To “equaliz[e] the relative ability of
individuals [to] influence the outcome of
elections.”
To provide “substantially greater room for
discussion and debate.”





To what extent may the government restrict
the speech (expenditures) of some
participants in the marketplace of ideas in
order to lessen the impact of differences in
the amount of money available and to thus
“improve” the debate?
SCOTUS?







“[T]he concept that government may restrict
the speech of some . . . in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment.”
WHAT DO YOU THINK?
Is the First Amendment a marketplace
conception or a town meeting conception?





Marketplace conception: it is inappropriate
for the government to intervene to produce a
fair debate.
Town-meeting conception: the government
may “call on” speakers in such a way as to
assure that all sides receive a fair hearing.



Would you trust the government with this
power?



Equalizing speech?



If it’s their jobs at stake?





Government can limit the amount a person
can contribute to a candidate.
But not an amount a person can spend on ads
independently.





No person may contribute more than $1000
directly to a candidate?
No person may spend more than $1000 to
support a candidate?







Isn’t the latter more suppressive? Isn’t the
Court right?
Expenditures limit actually puts a cap on what
you can do by any means.
Isn’t the former like a time, place, manner
restriction? You can still speak, just not in
that manner?








DOES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTRIBUTIONS
AND EXPENDITURES MAKE SENSE?
ANTI-CORRUPTION RATIONALE:
If a candidate finds out about large expenditures, is it
any different than a direct contribution?
The Court acknowledged this in McConnell v. F.E.C.,
540 U.S. 93 (2003) (issue advocacy v. express
advocacy), but then all but eliminated the distinction
in an “as applied” challenge in F.E.C. v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007).



TWO ISSUES



1) Is a corporation a “person”?



2) Does it even matter under the First
Amendment? (I.e., is “personhood” even an
issue?)



Contracts clause case involving Dartmouth
College.



Reaffirmed by the Court in late 1800s.



Reaffirmed by commercial speech cases.

Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm’n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980)







Corporate speech is protected by the First
Amendment.
The main purpose of the First Amendment is “the
free discussion of government affairs” and . . .
“this is no less true because the speech comes
from a corporation rather than an individual.”
“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of the source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual.”





“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech . . . .”
The importance is the speech, not the
speaker.



Upheld Michigan’s restrictions on corporate
expenditures.
Corporate treasury funds could not be used
for expenditures; funds must be solicited for
political purposes.



A new rationale: ANTI-DISTORTION.



WHAT IS THAT?







“The corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate
form . . . have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political
ideas.”
RATIONALE: VASTS AMOUNTS OF WEALTH
THAT ARE NOT ACCUMULATED FOR
EXPRESSION. (NOTE: that’s not equalization).



Since funds in the treasury are not an
extension of speech by donations, don’t they
distort the voice?



Doesn’t that make sense?



BUT WHAT?



And Belloti?







Does Austin reject the line between
contributions and expenditures drawn in
Buckley?

Buckley: expenditures do not corrupt. Only
contributions.

Is Austin’s anti-distortion rationale consistent
with the “anti-corruption” approach?



Scalia, dissenting: “Attention all citizens. To
assure the fairness of elections by preventing
disproportionate expression of the view of
any single powerful group, your Government
has decided that the following associations of
persons shall be prohibited from speaking in
support of any candidate:_____”



Who was “Citizens United”?



A non-profit political advocacy corporation.



Should its participation be shackled?





No express advocacy within 30 days of a
primary and 60 days of a general.
Requirement that they use PACs and raise
separate segregated funds to speak during
that time period.





“If Austin were correct, the Government could
prohibit a corporation from expressing
political views . . . such as printing books.”
Is that correct?





Is the fundamental error that “money” is
“speech”?
Is that the problem? That books are speech
but money is not?



Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was also
under-inclusive, because it did not include
media corporations.



“As a matter of law,” independent
expenditures do not give rise to the
appearance of corruption.



Buckley was about addressing quid pro quo



Citizens United: “Ingratiation and access . . .

corruption.

are not corruption.”





What about the minority shareholders?
Who don’t want to support a certain
candidate or issue?





If that were true, why limit it to 30 or 60
days?
Plus it’s over-inclusive, it covers even singleshareholder corporations.





Ban on direct corporate expression fails strict
scrutiny.
Not narrowly tailored to a compelling
governmental purpose.





The majority also said we should fear
campaign regulations from Congress,
because they will favor incumbents.
Isn’t that true?







The individual’s right to speak includes the
right to speak in association with other
individual persons.
The First Amendment is written in terms of
speech, not the speaker.
We should celebrate rather than condemn the
addition of this speech to public debate.







Citizens United is a non-profit and could
have used its PAC any time it wanted.
It could have used whatever funds it wanted
up until 30 days before the election.
All it is prohibited from doing is using its
general funds 30 days before the election.



PACs were permitted: separate segregated
funds established by a corporation for
political purposes.



Shareholders can do whatever they want.



What’s wrong with that?





We have placed identity-based restrictions on
speech.
Government employees are restricted in
certain circumstances.





Corporate expenditures corrupt!
(But doesn’t that mean that Buckley was
wrong?)



PACs ensure that those who pay for the
speech actually support it.



HUH?!



What’s wrong with that?





If they don’t like it, can’t they sell their
shares?
Or vote at the meeting?






The Millionaire Amendment to BCRA
Under that Amendment, if a candidate for the
United States House of Representatives spent
more than $350,000 of his personal funds, “a
new, asymmetrical regulatory scheme [came] into
play.”
The opponent of the candidate who exceeded
that limit was permitted to collect individual
contributions up to $6,900 per contributor—
three times the normal contribution limit of
$2,300.







Places a substantial burden on the First
Amendment right to use personal funds.
Must satisfy strict scrutiny.
Personal funds actually decrease the risk of
corruption.









If a privately-funded candidate spends more than
the lump-sum given to a publicly-financed
candidate because:
A) the candidate spends his or her own money;
B) raises more money;
C) receives support from independent
expenditure groups (even indirectly);
then the opponents are matched dollar for dollar.





Laws that substantially burden political
speech are subject to strict scrutiny.
Does it burden political speech, by
subsidizing the opponents?







SCOTUS: of course!
Unlike Davis (which was struck down), here
the publicly-financed candidate automatically
receives money if the privately-funded
candidate increases “speech.”
And there’s a multiplier effect: every public
opponent gets the increase.







“In such a situation, the matching funds provision
forces privately funded candidates to fight a
political hydra of sorts. Each dollar they spend
generates two adversarial dollars in response.”
Plus, it’s out of the control of the candidate.
If an independent group supports the candidate,
then the public financing is increased!



Increasing debate?



Leveling the playing field?



Anti-corruption interest?



Does it really increase debate?



Doesn’t it just increase one side of the debate?








SCOTUS: the government cannot choose which
side of the debate to favor.
Equalization is not a compelling governmental
purpose.
“Leveling the playing field”:
“[I]n a democracy, campaigning for office is not a
game.”







Anti-corruption?
If there is a shortage of public funds, the law
permits publicly-funded candidates to accept
private contributions up to the matching
point.
SCOTUS: how does that fight corruption?





SCOTUS: doesn’t the use of personal funds
reduce the potential for corruption?
And, since Buckley, we have said that
independent expenditures do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption.







It is direct contribution limits that tend to
corrupt.
And Arizona has some of the most austere
contribution limits in the nation.
So what could the matching fund program
really add?



“Except in a world gone topsy-turvy,
additional campaign speech and electoral
competition is not a First Amendment injury.”

Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC
v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2833 (2011)



AGGREGATE LIMITS in two year cycle:



$46,200 to candidates



$70,800 to anyone else





In Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), the
Court held Vermont’s $200 limit too low, not
sufficiently narrowed to the anti-corruption
purpose.
McCutcheon: the aggregate limits result in
the following – if an individual wants to
contribute to a candidate in all 486 federal
races, he or she would be limited to $85.29
per candidate. Lower than Vermont!



Should the right to association be protected?



Argument against?









It’s not in the text!
But the Court has repeatedly said it is a
fundamental right.
And, generally, strict scrutiny applies:
Is the government restriction on the right to
association narrowly tailored to a compelling
governmental interest?











Association is necessary for effective speech.
“Effective advocacy of . . . points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association.” NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
The “nexus” between speech and assembly.
The voice of a large group may be heard when individual
voices may not be.
Associations are where people find self-fulfillment. People
are social creatures!
You have to associate to exchange ideas!





THE “RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE” INCLUDES THE
RIGHT NOT TO ASSOCIATE (UNLESS STRICT
SCRUTINY IS PASSED).
STRICT SCRUTINY: NARROWLY TAILORED TO
A COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSE





The government can require payment of
union dues related to collective bargaining
activities, but not for political activities.
Why does the First Amendment permit
mandatory collection at all?









Compelling state interest in industrial peace:
Avoids the confusion that would result from
attempting to enforce two or more agreements;
Prevents inter-union rivalries;
Frees the employer from the possibility of facing
conflicting demands from different unions.



Chargeable activities:



1) germane to collective bargaining activity;





2) justified by the government interest in
keeping labor peace and avoiding “free
riders”; and
3) do not add to the burden on free speech in
an agency or union shop.









Non-union personal home-care assistants
Provide care through Illinois Dep’t of Human
Services.
Challenge the requirement that they be
compelled to pay union dues.
Organized by SEIU.







Plaintiffs argued that personal assistants are
paid by individual patients, not the state.
At any rate, no compelling state interest in
mandatory dues.
That is, the interests in collective bargaining
identified in Abood do not apply, because
personal assistants are “outside the
workplace.”







Plaintiffs argue that the interest in labor
peace is not the same here.
And that Abood should only apply with the
collective bargaining representation does not
involve matters of public concern.
(Following Justice Powell’s approach in his
concurrence in Abood.)






Seventh Circuit:
The state, at the very least, is a joint
employer.
Perfunctory rejection: “First Amendment does
not prohibit non-union state employees from
being compelled to pay mandatory fair share
fees to union to support legitimate, nonideological, union activities germane to
union's collective-bargaining representation.”

